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Abstract This article investigates the place of social relations in Deleuze and Guattari’s figure
of ‘cramped space’, a figure integral to their ‘minor politics’. Against social and political
theories that seek the source of political practice in a collective identity, the theory of cramped
space contends that politics arises among those who lack and refuse coherent identity, in their
encounter with the impasses, limits, or impossibilities of individual and collective subjectivity.
Cramped space, as Deleuze puts it, is a condition where ‘the people are missing’. This is not,
however, a condition of asocial isolation, but one full of social relations; the loss of identity is a
condition comprised only of social relations. The ramifications of this thesis are here explored
through Marx’s critique of citizenship, the socio-historical conjuncture of cramped space in
relation to the ‘communization’ problematic, and the Palestinian mediator of sumud.
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It is a commonplace in social science to seek the source of political practice in a collective
identity—the identity of a people, nation, class, or minority—as it comes to articulate itself, or
its grievances, in the social realm. This commonplace is upended in Deleuze and Guattari’s
figure of ‘cramped space’, which contends that politics arises among those who lack and refuse
coherent identity, in their encounter with the impasses, limits, or impossibilities of individual
and collective subjectivity. Cramped space, as Deleuze (1989, p. 216) puts it, is a condition
where ‘the people are missing’.
The notion of cramped space was integral to my 2003 book Deleuze, Marx and Politics,
which sought to develop a concept of ‘minor politics’ from intersections between Marx’s
formulation of the proletariat and Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of ‘minority’ (Thoburn 2003).
Prompted by this journal special issue on global mobility under cramped conditions to reflect
further on these themes, I aim here to deepen and expand the concepts of cramped space and
minor politics, proceeding in part as response to two criticisms of these concepts from the
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realms of political philosophy and social movement activism: first, that minor politics
champions ‘minority identities’ in an undifferentiated social flow (a critique made by Peter
Hallward); second, from a quarter more sympathetic to the thesis, that I cede too much agency
to hostile social forces and risk ‘privileging the most cramped sector, the most oppressed’
(The Free Association). While these critiques draw seemingly opposite conclusions—that
the concept of minor politics entails either too much or too little autonomy—they both
pertain to the nature of the relationship between cramped space and social relations. This is
a relationship that is central to this special issue’s intervention—and to contemporary politics
more broadly—in thinking the politics of global social relations in terms of constraint as much
as of flow, or, more accurately, in the constraints that are intrinsic to flow.
I hence concentrate here on the place in cramped space of social relations, and I do so also
with the aim to specify the historicity of the concept, as it pertains to the demise of the working
class subject of Fordism and the critical appropriation of that demise. Developing these points
raises the question of what kind of collectivity arises in cramped space, if here there is no
individual or collective identity, a point that I pursue in relation to the dynamics of minority
‘mediators’. This article is primarily theoretical, but my discussion of mediators leads into
consideration of a particular example of politicised cramped space, in the Palestinian mediator
of ‘sumud’ as explored in research on Palestinian minor politics by Lena Meari. I would note
that while the structure of this article is loosely based on responses to and uses of my Deleuze,
Marx and Politics, my aim is not to defend that book but to develop through discussion
analytic points of political pertinence to the social experience and theory of cramped space.
The Social Relations of Majority and Minority
Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of cramped space was first proposed in their 1975 book on
Kafka, as a component of their concept of ‘minor literature’. It seeks to conceptualise the way
that minorities experience the interplay between the individual and the social, the personal and
the political—or, better, how the minority experience is characterised by the breakdown of
these boundaries—and the ramifications of this breakdown across a range of linguistic,
aesthetic, and political phenomena. The argument is made in contrast to the experience of
‘majority’. Majority describes a system of identities that are constituted in and nurtured by
social relations, by the self-bolstering security that class, gender, race, sexuality, citizenship,
age, language, and so forth, confer upon those who inhabit the privileged position in these
social configurations. Here, there is a fit between majority identity and the social that,
paradoxically, gives majority identity autonomy from the social. For insofar as social
relations serve to facilitate and bolster majority identities in this way, the social appears at a
remove, an inconsequential background for the free play of associating individuals. Hence,
Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p. 17) write of the majority condition that ‘the individual concern
(familial, marital, and so on) joins with other no less individual concerns, the social milieu
serving as a mere environment or a background’. Though they do not reference Marx at this
point, there is a remarkable consonance here with his formulation of the bourgeois polity, in
consideration of which we can start to challenge the self-satiated security of the majority
individual.
In his ‘On the Jewish Question’, a text also concerned with the political nature of minority
conditions and their interplay with majority standards, Marx shows how the bourgeois
individual of modern civil society—the ‘citizen’, the subject of the ‘rights of man’, the
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‘possessive individual’ as we know it since C. B. MacPherson—is premised on an opposition
between individual and social existence. This time, the social, that which facilitates and bolsters
the individual, is experienced with a little variation, less as inconsequential background than as
nagging threat, as that which impinges on the primary autonomy of the individual—and of
course we can think forward to Margaret Thatcher’s (1987) protestations against ‘society’
(‘There is no such thing!’) as an archetypical instance of this sensibility in neoliberal times. The
real delimiting power, however, is the social form of the individual itself, for Marx reveals the
freedom that is conferred by bourgeois identity to be a condition of constraint. The threat to the
good life, as it were, is not the social but the ‘liberty’, in Marx’s (1975a, p. 230) cutting phrase,
of the ‘confined individual, confined to himself’. The individual, a product of capitalist social
relations that masquerades as its ground and cause, constrains sociality (‘species being’ or
‘communal being’, in Marx’s parlance) into the isolated subject of private property:
In the rights of man it is not man who appears as a species-being; on the contrary,
species-life itself, society, appears as a framework extraneous to the individuals, as a
limitation of their original independence. The only bond which holds them together is
natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and their
egoistic persons (p. 230).
Bourgeois politics partakes of and enforces this structure, such that social being experiences
a double degradation, not only excised from the confined and partial individual, but reduced to
a mere support for the latter: ‘the [political] sphere in which man behaves as a communal being
[Gemeinwesen] is degraded to a level below the sphere in which he behaves as a partial being’
(p. 231). To recover that social as the condition of politicised being, Marx turns to those who
are excluded from the citizen. For the bourgeois subject and its claimed universal community,
as Marx saw it, was not only a partial and isolated identity, it was also available only to a
particular class, race, and gender. That is to say, it was structured on a series of exclusions, as
the tenuous relation to property—or being property—meant that slaves, racialised others,
women, and the working class were excised from the self-identity of the citizen and its
supposedly universal community, their social conditions of being privatised or naturalised,
deemed outside the realm of the political. And yet for Marx it is precisely the politicisation of
these excluded social relations that constitutes politics proper, the ground of the ‘social’
revolution rather than the ‘merely political revolution, the revolution which leaves the pillars
of the building standing’ (Marx 1975b, p. 253). Hence, in an argument replete with paradoxes,
it was the excluded who bore the universal, in that their exclusion undermined the purported
universalism of the bourgeois subject, and that their politics necessarily brings forward
concrete social relations and not abstract identity as its substance, the social relations where
one finds the ‘real movement which abolishes the present state of things’ (Marx and Engels
1974, pp. 56–7).
It is on this front of the excluded or marginalised and their experience of social relations that
Deleuze and Guattari develop their concept ofminority, though under the changed circumstances
of the extended reach of formal citizenship that has (unevenly) accompanied modernity since
Marx’s time. Here, the relation between the individual and the social takes a rather different form
than it does for majorities. Minorities are those who are positioned unfavourably in relation to
privileged poles of class, gender, race, and so on, such that social relations no longer facilitate
coherent and autonomous identity, even when citizenship is granted. For Black Americans, to
take an example recently pushed into global consciousness by the US Black Lives Matter
movement, formal citizenship offers no security or coherent identity amidst the different but
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overlapping social constraints of unemployment, spatial segregation, prison, and police murder
with impunity, for these constraints are embedded within social relations whose workings are so
impervious to challenge from the realms of abstract rights and legal equalities that one must ask
whether civil society is in fact grounded upon their perpetuation. To draw from Frank B.
Wilderson (2003), in the gratuitous anti-Black violence of the US police against populations
newly superfluous to the requirements of capital, and in the civil debarment of Black people
through mass incarceration in the for-profit prison network, the foundational exclusion consti-
tutive of bourgeois universality—the exclusion of the slave: not possessor of property but
property possessed, subject to violence without reason or restraint—is carried over as a condition
of the perpetuation of civil society under crisis conditions.
Returning to Deleuze and Guattari, in the minority condition we see, then, that the social milieu
ceases to be mere background and floods individual experience, rendering identity unstable or
‘impossible’, as life becomes a tangle of conflicting imperatives and constraints without a self-
coherent centre of identity. It is the condition of cramped space, where ‘the private affair merges
with the social—or political—immediate’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p. 17; Deleuze 1989, p.
218). As with Marx, this is the properly political experience. Unlike the more or less inconse-
quential ‘individual concerns’ of majority politics—where no political intrigue is ‘specifically
indispensible or absolutely necessary but all become as one in a large space’—cramped space
‘forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics’, for, without an autonomous
identity, even the most personal, intimate situation is composed of social relations and experienced
as such (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p. 17). Social life presents boundaries or impasses rather than
enabling possibilities or clear options; there is no identity that is not impossible to inhabit
unproblematically. Yet, the impossibility of activity is matched with the impossibility of doing
nothing if life is to be lived. As in Beckett’s (1979, p. 382) formula, ‘I can’t go on, I’ll go on’,
politics thus becomes a process of ‘tracing a path between impossibilities’, in Deleuze’s (1995,
p. 133) words—or better, of tracing a path amidst, with, and against impossibilities.
Before proceeding, I want to fend off three possible miss-readings that the term cramped
space might otherwise encourage. First, though it clearly has a spatial dimension, the way the
minority condition is constituted in relation to the partitions and borders that traverse geo-
social territory (the mobile borders of the nation state, for instance, where spatial partition
is a primary determinant of the differential partition of citizenship rights), cramped space
is a condition of social existence in the round. It involves all the dimensions of social
being, including temporal qualities, affective conditions, linguistic forms and procedures,
technologies, sensory and aesthetic paradigms, and so on. Second, the cramped condition
might be an experience of circumscribed confinement—being bound to the home, incar-
cerated in an immigration detention centre or a prison cell—but the concept seeks to
describe not confinement as such but immanence to the social, to the multitude of
constraints and commands associated with lives interlaced with and buffeted by global
social relations. Hence, undocumented migration—where constraint and flow are interlaced—
presents a paradigmatic minor experience. Third, for all its loss of identity and immanence to
social relations, cramped space is not a loss of particularity, quite the contrary. The mesh of
complex and contradictory social relations in every particularity produces experiences much
more various and contingent than the formatted differences of the major individual, such that it
is only in and through particular and situated differences that the political treatment of social life
can be grasped and affirmed. In cramped space, ‘The individual concern thus becomes all the
more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p. 17).
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Minority, Capital, Proletariat
I have argued that minorities are constituted by and interlaced with social relations. It is on this
condition that the politics of cramped space is founded—quite the opposite of the critique
made by Hallward (2006, pp. 185, 162), that in this and associated readings of Deleuze one
finds only ‘minor identities’, ‘evanescent’ and ‘indifferent to the politics of this world’.
Specifying this point, Hallward argues further that Deleuze’s politics offers little to grasp
contemporary ‘mechanisms of exploitation and domination’ and relations of ‘conflict and
solidarity’ (p. 162). I will address these later points through another critique of the minor
politics thesis, now specifically with regard to the figure of cramped space.
If Hallward finds in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minority too much autonomy from
the mechanisms of exploitation, the critique of my reading made by the Free Association is
that there is too little. Consideration of their argument assists in delineating further the specific
role of capitalism in the theory of cramped space and of the historical conjuncture to which the
concept of minority pertains. The Free Association frame my interpretation of cramped space
as a concern with the ‘dangers and limits’ imposed by capital and, insofar as they see cramped
space as a useful political concept, they separate the condition from its direct relation to capital
(for it to become a self-possession of social movements, an internal dynamic, as I take up
later). To do otherwise, they argue, is to undermine the ‘active’ quality of social movements
and to revert to a politics that seeks and affirms a political constituency of those who are most
oppressed. In their words:
Thoburn uses this [concept of cramped space] to argue against any idea that we exist in a
state of plenitude. Rather, we need to pay attention to the limits that capital displaces
onto us. While we respect the need to be aware of dangers and limits, we think it is very
important always to emphasise that we are active and capital is reactive. Perhaps we are
overly sensitive to this issue, but we believe that any other emphasis risks a return to
identifying and privileging the most cramped sector, the most oppressed people, which
we believe would be a terrible mistake. Cramped space for us is something we create,
something we have inside ourselves, not something capital does to us. As Deleuze goes
on to say: ‘A creator’s someone who creates their own impossibilities, and thereby
creates possibilities’ (The Free Association 2005, p. 576).
Cramped conditions certainly carry many dangers and oppressions, but as I hope is
apparent from the discussion thus far, the concept of minority cramped space aims not to
cautiously warn of these. Rather, the concept seeks to grasp the minority condition of being
interlaced with social relations and to assert these social relations in their multiform variety and
complexity—not social movement collectivity—as the substance of politics. Contrary to the
Free Association’s separation of an active and autonomous social movement ‘we’ from capital,
the concept of cramped space teaches that minorities have no autonomy, that capitalist social
relations are not extraneous to a collective subject, but the very substance of collective being,
where the subject is missing—the ‘we’, at most fragmented, buffeted, and unstable, only
emerges in the practical critique of the capitalist conditions of its being. This is not to
disempower minorities or to be excessively cautious. Against the degraded politics of the
bourgeois polity, where social relations are a mere background, it is precisely in the loss of
autonomy that one arrives at a concept and experience of politics that is truly adequate to the
complexities of contemporary social life—even as, or because, this is lived as a field of
impasse and impossibility.
The People Are Missing 371
Still, perhaps the concept of minor politics privileges those who are most cramped, most
oppressed? This is not the aim, for the immanence of minority conditions with social relations
is conceived of as the basis of universality. As we saw with Marx, the abstract universal of the
bourgeois subject was revealed to be a restricted particular, while the excluded particulars were
bearers of the universal—both due to their exclusion and to the social, not mere political,
nature of this exclusion and the solutions adequate to it. Hence the fundamental significance of
Deleuze and Guattari’s alignment of minority with Marx’s concept of universality, the
proletariat. They add a proviso, though this is less a distancing tactic than an attempt to
foreground the self-abolition that is integral to Marx’s concept (as I pick up below):
The power of minority, of particularity, finds its figure or its universal consciousness in the
proletariat. But as long as the working class defines itself by an acquired status, or even by
a theoretically conquered State, it appears only as ‘capital’, a part of capital (variable
capital), and does not leave the plan(e) of capital (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p. 472).
Ours Is the Age of Minorities
Thinking through the consequences of the relation between the cramped space of minority and
the class condition of the proletariat necessitates consideration of the specific historical
conjuncture to which Deleuze and Guattari’s concept pertains. Deleuze and Guattari first
articulate the concept à propos Kafka’s socio-linguistic condition of a Prague Jew writing in
German amidst the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire, the disorienting semantic and textual
qualities of Kafka’s writing handling this quintessentially modern experience of geopolitical
reconfiguration and migratory flux. But as the concept of minority is developed in A Thousand
Plateaus, it tracks the capitalist transformations of the late 1970s. ‘Ours is becoming the age of
minorities,’Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 469) write here, with specific reference to structural
developments in capitalist accumulation associated with globalisation and post-Fordism. The
imperative of capitalist accumulation to set and overcome limits (that is, to delimit and exhaust
territories and social forms, while moving beyond those to new territories and forms, in
combined and uneven development) has produced an ever more fragmented, variegated, and
mutable patchwork of unequal exchange, exploitation, and poverty, where ‘peripheral zones of
underdevelopment’ become constitutive features of the ‘center’ (p. 469). Global flows of
migration are a central dimension of this condition, as is the breakdown of the identity
structures of Fordism—where, in its normative majority form, ‘subjection remained centred
on labour’—such that populations are henceforth ‘abandoned to erratic work (subcontracting,
temporary work, or work in the underground economy), and their official subsistence is
assured only by State allocations and wages subject to interruption’ (p. 469). Such tendencies
have of course taken leaps and bounds in the 35 years since A Thousand Plateaus was
published, as precarity and punitive workfare have become labour market norms and work
has withdrawn from the circuit of social reproduction for significant sectors of the global
population—with state brutality filling out the vacated space, as has been laid bare in the USA
by the Ferguson and Baltimore riots (2014 and 2015) against the murderous structural racism
of the police (see Endnotes 2015).
In so locating the socio-historical conjuncture of the concept of minority, Deleuze and
Guattari draw from the Italian Marxist currents of operaismo and autonomia. It is momentary
but at key points, with Deleuze and Guattari referencing Antonio Negri on the rise of
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precarious work and Yann Moulier-Boutang on the breakdown of the majority subject of
traditional Marxism—‘the national Worker, qualified, male and over thirty-five’—and quoting
Mario Tronti to assist their case for considering the proletariat as a class of self-abolition: ‘To
struggle against capital, the working class must fight against itself insofar as it is capital’
(Moulier-Boutang, cited in Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p. 469; Tronti, cited in ibid., p. 571).
And yet, Deleuze and Guattari share less with this critical scene than is often thought. For its
signal thesis of the primacy of struggles in determining capitalist development opens the
possibility—as especially evident in Hardt and Negri’s Empire trilogy—of conceptualising the
working class and capital as independent terms, the latter becoming merely the external
apparatus of capture of an autonomous subjective content (Thoburn 2003). Hence, if one is
to draw out the socio-historical juncture of minority in a manner that foregrounds not
autonomy but cramped space, it can be more productive to look elsewhere, which I do here,
turning to the ‘communization’ problematic in contemporary communist thought, especially as
developed in the journals Théorie Communiste and Endnotes.
The Impasse of Workers’ Identity
The theory of communization proceeds from the argument I touched upon above, that through
the 1970s the dominant class form of the twentieth century—a collective workers’ identity
whose subjection was centred upon labour—went into terminal crisis. It was a class form that
the French journal Théorie Communiste calls ‘programmatism’, where communist futures
were to be founded on social relations formed in present modes of struggle, such that
communism was the affirmation of an existent proletarian subjectivity. In their words:
programmatism… is a theory and practice of class struggle in which the proletariat finds,
in its drive toward liberation, the fundamental elements of a future social organisation
which become the programme to be realised. This revolution is thus the affirmation of the
proletariat, whether as a dictatorship of the proletariat, workers’ councils, the liberation of
work, a period of transition, the withering of the state, generalised self-management, or a
‘society of associated producers’ (Théorie Communiste 2008, p. 155).
Marx in his more visionary moments pointed beyond this framework of programmatism,
positing the proletariat, along the lines picked out above, as the class not of self-affirmation but of
self-abolition. It is a formulation, as in this example from TheHoly Family, that crackles against his
time and ours: ‘The proletariat … is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its
opposite, private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat. It is the
negative side of the antithesis, its restlessness within its very self, dissolved and self-dissolving
private property’ (Marx and Engels 1975, p. 36). But up until the 1970s, the nature of the class
relation, or the capitalist organisation of production and reproduction, was such that the working
class was socially determined to recognise itself as a positive identity—amassed and concentrated
in factories and industrial cities, and affirmed as such first through its independent institutions, by
which it gained organisational power and social respectability, and later through its claim on
citizenship, in its political and legal recognition within the social democratic state.
Under these conditions, the programme of revolution was carried within the working class on
the basis of its role as provider of labour. This is the transhistorical understanding of labour that was
intrinsic to the workers’movement, labour ‘that constitutes the social world and is the source of all
social wealth’, as Moishe Postone’s (1996, p. 8) critique characterises it. And this is the crux of the
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problem with the class identity of the workers’ movement. In so taking an historically specific
feature of capitalism alone to be a universal human condition, the resultant politics necessarily took
its field of contestation to be distribution of the products of labor and not critique and abolition of
labor and its subject, a ‘new mode of politically administering and economically regulating the
same industrial mode of production to which capitalism gave rise’ (p. 9).
We hence see that the apparent autonomy of the working class from capital, as established
in the institutions of the workers’ movement, turns out to have been the specific form of its
integration with capital, as its institutions and motivations fashioned an affirmative subject out
of that which was imposed by capital, and so all too easily came to merge with the motivations
of capitalist development. To affirm working class autonomy—with real gains in the quality of
life, no doubt—was simultaneously to affirm the capital-labour relation. As such, the workers’
movement ‘loses its way’ not so much in being insufficiently revolutionary, but in having a
content that was insufficiently differentiated from that of capitalist revolution (Théorie
Communiste 2008, p. 156). Of this tendency, the state-led and totalitarian industrialisation of
the Soviet Union, which far exceeded in rapidity what market capitalism could have achieved,
is the most acute moment, Bolshevik ‘counterrevolution’ as ‘the accomplishment against
[proletarians] of their revolution’ (p. 174). And here we confront the structural impasse of the
workers’movement, whereby ‘the proletariat seeks to liberate against capital its social strength
which exists in capital,’ and exists there only (p. 157). Even in its more radical variants that
come after 1917 as a challenge to the counter-revolution of Bolshevism, communism was still
formulated as a question of organizational form—most emblematically, the workers’ council
versus the Leninist party—rather than as practical critique of the content of work and capitalist
social relations, or, it is the same thing, of itself as subject of labour (Dauvé 1997).
Moving from the critique of programmatism to the periodisation of class today, for Théorie
Communiste it is only now that this horizon of the affirmation of labour and the positivity of
working class identity can be overcome, after the cycle of struggles of the late 1960s and early
1970s (where the ‘refusal of work’ within the sphere of labour, and struggles over social
reproduction among women, racialised groups, and others structurally marginalised by that
sphere, signalled the crisis of the programmatic affirmation of workers’ identity) and the
subsequent restructuring through globalisation and financialisation. This is in large measure
because what Marx called the ‘real subsumption’ of labour in capital has reached a stage where
capital no longer needs an affirmative subject of labour—having found the rigidities of
national labour markets, the welfare state, collective wage bargaining, and so forth, to be
obstacles to valorisation—and is instead increasingly self-positing. As Endnotes (2008)
develop the point, there is simply no ground upon which to found a positive and enduring
workers’ identity or to project its coming into being as a revolutionary subject. The global
fragmentation of labour; the long-term decline in real wages; the move to the heart of the wage
relation of flexibility, precarity, and under-unemployment; and the extension of super-
exploitation and informal work attendant on the tendential rise in superfluous populations—
from all these comes ‘the impossibility of the proletariat to relate to itself positively against
capital: the impossibility of proletarian autonomy’ (Endnotes 2008, p. 214). In other words,
class—the condition of needing to sell one’s labour, whether achieved or not, and of being
dependent on those whose labour power is enabled by the unpaid work of reproduction—is
evacuated of positive identity and becomes increasingly experienced and understood as an
external imposition. Hence, when workplace struggles occur today, their aims are largely
limited to defending jobs against layoffs, or extracting redundancy payments rather than
demanding the right to work, within which neither positive identity nor any real solution to
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the difficulty of self-reproduction is readily found. Their limits are quickly reached, engage-
ment with which—and pushing beyond—may well be the condition of struggles to come.
The point is not of course that identity vanishes. Indeed, the collapse of class as a positive
identity witnesses a swarming of identities—grounded inwork or not—that are offered and pushed
as positive solutions, from the maligned ‘white working class’ of national populist and far Right
discourse, to the entrepreneurial self, with its metabolisation—one part necessity, another part vain
hope—of neoliberal regimes of insecurity and competition. We see also instances of a dogged
clinging to the self among working class populations riven with precarity and debt, those,
paradoxically, for whom the self least coheres, and yet who find themselveswithout other resource,
bereft of supportive social institutions in a social realm encountered as humiliation and betrayal
(Silva 2013).Minority, too, has its identity forms, as I touch upon below regarding the depoliticised
Palestinian identity co-produced by the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli state. But the limits
inherent to these identities could not be more apparent, even in their own terms. Of course, the
resultant fragility and instability of identity is not without its own identity-effects, recharging the
pursuit of a coherence that ever fails, and with dangerous consequences. But such are the kinds of
problems that face a politics that would be adequate to the collapse of workers’ identity.
I hope it is clear from this discussion that it is not too much of a leap to say that in the theory of
communizationwe have a socio-historical specification of what Deleuze andGuattari call cramped
space, and one that draws out its structural condition, a condition that renders the majority identity
of the worker obsolete, impossible to inhabit as a positive and coherent subjective form. Andwhile
the broader features and ramifications of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minority are not at all
shared by communization theory, the latter does share the concern to fashion a political theory on
the loss and impossibility of identity. If a programme founded upon the affirmation of workers’
identity is now passed, communism turns instead on encounters with the limits to identity, on the
structural impasses, complicities, and exclusions that condition sectoral identities, social move-
ments, and racialised and gendered groups. Here, the limit is less a boundary that solicits
transgression than the immanent horizon of self-overcoming:
The theory of communization alerts us to the limits inherent in… struggles, and indeed is
attentive to the possibilities of a real revolutionary rupture opening up because of, rather
than in spite of, those limits.… [I]n any actual supercession of the capitalist class relation
we ourselves must be overcome; ‘we’ have no ‘position’ apart from the capitalist class
relation… [I]t is a rupture with the reproduction of what we are that will necessarily form
the horizon of our struggles (Endnotes n.d., p. 29, 31).
Perhaps this sounds like a betrayal of constituencies in struggle, withholding support from their
barely achieved coherence. So let me be clear that to disrupt the identities of struggle in this way is
not to be against solidarity, quite the reverse. The overcoming of limits is a solidarity—a terribly
fraught endeavour, certainly—that is produced in and through the undoing of the sectoral and
minority identities that bind social groups to the conditions they nominally oppose, where the limit
is a potential opening to solidarities and social relations that are otherwise structurally curtailed.
Willed Poverty and Minority Mediators
To condense the preceding discussion, we can say that in the current conjuncture, ‘the proletariat
is in itself nothing, but a nothing full of social relations’ (Théorie Communiste 2006, p. 70).
Here, cramped space is not, as it is for the Free Association, a condition that could exist in
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separation from capital, because it is the social experience of capital. And yet, as the Free
Association point out, Deleuze (1995, p. 133) does evoke the self-creation of cramped space, to
make his point again: ‘A creator’s someone who creates their own impossibilities, and thereby
creates possibilities’. The individualised dimension of this and related passages in Deleuze are I
think of limited use; thankfully, they are rarer and less rigorously developed than his analysis of
the social and impersonal dimensions of minority production. But there is something important
in his formulation here nonetheless, regarding the dynamic of cramped space. For the Free
Association, it confirms their understanding of cramped space as a dynamic internal to social
movements, where cramped space signifies a self-reflexive moment of forcing a movement’s
downswing away from calcified identity into intensive experiment, something like a social
movement combustion engine that causes a new upswing to burst forth from constraint. But if
cramped space cannot be understood as a social movement property separated from capitalist
relations, how can one make sense of Deleuze’s comment? I see it as attempting to evoke a
propulsive critical sensibility, where the structural condition of cramped space is associated also
with a certain ‘willed poverty’, as, in Kafka’s words, ‘one strives to see [the boundary] before it is
there, and often sees this limiting boundary everywhere’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p. 17;
Kafka, cited in ibid.). In this sense, to create one’s own impossibilities is the opposite of self-
creation; rather, it is to expand one’s field of perception to the manifold of global social relations
that traverse cramped particularity, one’s perceptivity to the social disruption of the autonomous
self, and, it is the same thing, to continually ward off tendencies to identity, to the seductions of
self-affirmation. This is the sensibility of cramped political practice, a persistent deferral of
subjective plenitude that forces ever-new critical engagement with social relations. Rather than
allow the solidification of particular political and cultural routes, forms, and identities, the ‘willed
poverty’ of cramped space ever serves to draw thought and practice back into a milieu of
contestation, argument, and engagement, forcing thought and practice from within the
constraints and impossibilities of social relations.
One might conclude from the discussion thus far that there is simply no basis for
collectivity in cramped conditions, but that is not the case. Deleuze and Guattari in fact go
some way to elaborating the conditions of cramped collectivity, of minority collectivity
without identity. I will take up one aspect of this, regarding the role of ‘mediators’ in cramped
space.
The ungrounded ground of the critical interrogation of social relations that we have seen thus far
has an expressive and textual dimension. Deleuze and Guattari draw this from Kafka, who sketches
an argument in his diaries that minor literatures emerge not in great works of fiction, in the novel, but
in ‘magazines’, in intensive and fragmented expressive milieus characterised by ‘liveliness’ and
‘conflict’ (and one cannot but recall in this context Kafka’s own inclination toward the literary forms
of the short story and aphorism, his three novels remaining incomplete) (Kafka 1999, p. 150). In
these marginal mediums and forms, what major literature would view as the social background or
‘cellar’—the terrain of everyday concerns, of particular intrigues that lie outside of the legitimate
space of writing proper—is drawn up into the foreground of textual and aesthetic production:
There is universal delight in the literary treatment of petty themes whose scope is not
permitted to exceed the capacity of small enthusiasms and which are sustained by their
polemical possibilities. Insults, intended as literature, roll back and forth. What in great
literature goes on down below, constituting a not indispensable cellar of the structure, here
takes place in the full light of day, what is there a matter of passing interest for a few, here
absorbs everyone no less as a matter of life and death (Kafka 1999, p. 150).
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This ‘cellar’ of polemics, intrigues, and everyday concerns substitutes for the grand histories or
traditions that occupy national literatures, since without a coherent identity or people, a relation to
anything that minoritiesmight describe as their history is at most opaque, broken, and uncertain. But
this too is a condition of cramped production, since, shorn of the ballast of readymade traditions and
collective memories, the intense reworking of social conditions in the present inclines not into the
past, of achieved and continuous identity, but into the future. And here minorities do have a certain
agency, or an agency that is adjacent to them—an agency of themediator. Deleuzewrites that critical
manoeuvre in cramped space is aided by mediators, which have a catalytic capacity to carry,
intensify, and diversify the interrogation of cramped conditions. A mediator can be real, imaginary,
animate, or inanimate—a person, an object, plants, animals, myths, a certain discourse, an image, a
refrain, or a problem (Deleuze 1995, pp. 125–7). Corresponding to the majority form, Right-wing
mediators reflect and confirm established identities, collectivities, and truths—consider the role of an
established national flag, a state-fuelled commonsense trope of ‘workers and shirkers’, themobilised
melancholia of wartime spirit, the weaponised myth, as I will come to shortly, of ‘a land without a
people for a peoplewithout a land’. Deleuze calls these ‘direct’mediators, insofar as they are directly
indexed to a people and a place (p. 128). They contrast to the ‘indirect or free mediators’ of the Left,
which bear themore fragile quality of crampedminority experience, having no established identities
and truths upon which to gain traction, or, put otherwise, relating to established identities and truths
only insofar as they seek to overturn them and make visible the oppression or constraint that
otherwise remains hidden—it goes someway to explainwhy theLeft has less success in establishing
mediators than the Right (p. 128). But in being ungrounded in this way, Left mediators—I would
prefer to call them ‘minority mediators’ or ‘communist mediators’, to leave behind the Left/Right
dichotomy of the bourgeois polity—take on a certain agential quality, a quality pertaining precisely
to their indirect nature.
‘Indirect’ here draws from Deleuze’s (1989, p. 148) particular understanding of ‘free indirect
discourse’, a discourse or problem dislodged from any one speaking subject that hence carries a
desubjectified and somewhat uncanny quality, its existence between the unstable individual and the
missing collective. Such indirect problems endure insofar as they have an inexact correspondence to
any particular minority situation, maintaining a structural incompletion, leaving them at once more
prone to failure and open to further unfurling as they are taken up in open-ended ‘series’, in diverse
and various conditions (Deleuze 1995, p. 125). This gives the free indirect problem or mediator a
bricolage quality; it is a broken, cumulative, processual, and unfinished entity—a ‘monster’; it ‘has a
life of its own: an image that is always stitched together, patched up, continually growing along the
way’ (Deleuze 1989, p. 150; Deleuze 1997, p. 118). And as this description suggests, it has also a
volitional or catalytic capacity. A product of the multiple voices that comprise it, a free indirect
mediator, in its quasi-autonomous condition, reacts back upon them to become a cause, as it draws
out or induces ideas, practices, associations, affects that are adequate to it, and to its unfurling.
The Palestinian Mediator of Sumud
I will take one instance of such a free indirect mediator, regarding Palestinian struggles against
Israel’s brutal regime of settler colonialism. Deleuze not infrequently takes up the Palestinian cause
in his discussions of minority and the notion of the ‘missing’ people, and it features too in his
account of mediators. The Zionist project of ‘a people without a land for land without a people’
constitutes Palestinians as a cramped minority across coordinates that are territorial, economic,
historical, geo-political, linguistic, and intimate all at once. This is the Nakba or ‘catastrophe’ of
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1948, when Israel was founded on the expulsion of 80 % of the existent Palestinian population, and
the militarised colonisation and hollowing out of the occupied territories from 1967 (Makdisi 2008;
Weizman 2007). In the face of this, Palestinian struggle is, no doubt necessarily, framed as seeking
recognition as a people, but it operates on the conditions by which Palestinians are constituted by
Israel as an impossibility. As LenaMeari (2014) explores in relation to the concept of minor politics,
a significant plank of this struggle has been the mediator of ‘sumud’, on which I focus for the
remainder of this article.
Sumud or ‘steadfastness’ is an ethico-political construction of Palestinian collectivity and
struggle, signifying at once refusal and endurance of the occupation, clinging to the land in the
face of Israeli conditions of active erasure (Halper 2006; Schiocchet 2011). Immanent to
struggle in both quotidian and exceptional moments, sumud has a polymorphous quality,
though I will focus here on its form as mobilised from the late 1970s to the early 1990s in
association with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Here, sumud pertains
especially to conditions of incarceration, interrogation, and torture by the Israel Security
Agency, the Shabak, where it designates a refusal to confess and disclose. It is a refusal not
arbitrarily chosen but forced by circumstance, insofar as it addresses the ‘inevitable predica-
ment’ of the colonial encounter, whereby politics can only effectively proceed if it can
adequately confront the limit of interrogation, as the embryonic PFLP found to its cost after
a first wave of arrests (Meari 2014, p. 561). Intrinsic to this particular task but with cascading
ramifications, Meari describes sumud as a ‘singular-collective mode of being’ through the
terms of cramped space that I have been discussing (p. 553). That is to say, it is a
‘desubjectiviation’ derived from ‘continuous engagement with the flows and constraints of
the colonial situation that endows Palestinians with forces to endure their lives, through and in
opposition to, the fixed colonial terms and relations promoted by the colonizers and those
Palestinians constrained by the terms of normalization with them’ (pp. 550–1).
Sumud is primarily a technique, or an open set of techniques that further its aim. Sumud
seeks to persistently recharge the interrogation encounter with its antagonistic core of colonial
social relations, working against the interrogators’ efforts to evacuate those relations from the
scene. It thus breaks the seduced and forced individualization and privatization that is intrinsic
to the structure of interrogation—with its attempted production of self-interest and individual
salvation through confession, disclosure, and release. In other words, sumud is a critical
embracing of cramped space against the false or apolitical solution of proffered identity. As
in the interrogation cell, so in the social realm more broadly, for the enforced individualisation
of interrogation has a structural correspondence with the development of Palestinian politics
subsequent to the 1993 Oslo Accords under the Palestinian Authority. The post-Oslo condition
can be described as the seduction and enforcement of minority autonomy or identity, whereby
a Palestinian minority is abstracted from its cramped conditions and bound to the depoliticising
or asocial structures of the state, under conditions of extreme deprivation and violence. Here,
the Palestinian Authority functions as a client pseudo-state, governing the West Bank in
furtherance of Israeli colonial agendas and ‘saturated with liberal forms of politics and the
process of reproduction of liberal individual sentiments and attachments’: the transformation
of resistance into the work of nongovernmental organisations, dependent as this is on foreign
funding and conditions; the shift from resisting the occupation to establishing Palestinian
institutions; the proliferation of discourses of rights and international law; and the adoption of
neoliberal development agendas (p. 556; see also Makdisi 2008; Weizman 2007).
Returning to the conditions of incarceration, in this most isolated and individualised of
conditions, sumud produces collectivity, but less as a collective subject than a collective
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opening of perception to the pain and antagonism of oppressive social relations. The complex
nature of this collectivity is apparent in the words of Ahmad Qatamesh, then a prominent
underground leader, who frames sumud as an ethico-political convention ‘reached among us out
of the conviction that history had positioned us in a particular place that we have to respond to
by embracing its burdens’ (cited in Meari 2014, p. 564, emphasis added). It is a burden with
numerous modalities, which those practicing sumud describe calling upon: the Nakba; the mass
incarceration that is intrinsic to Israeli colonial rule; painstakingly told stories of interrogation
imparted by those who achieved in sumud and by those who failed; the many deaths under
interrogation. It is a willed poverty that mobilises: ‘Imagining my death… for not providing a
confession opened my possibilities, not ended them’ (Amin, cited in Meari 2014, p. 570).
As the experience of emotional, cognitive, and physical pain that is intrinsic to interrogation
would suggest, sumud bears and produces a breakdown of the division between private and
political, intimate and social, a breakdown that as we have seen is elemental to cramped
minority politics. And this pertains not only to pain, but to a flood of intimate relations and
sensibilities into the interrogation scene, as apparent in Riyad’s account of his sumud, the
texture of which was fashioned with thoughts of his mother, lover, and Palestinian martyrs,
without pause between:
During the long interrogation sessions and torture I thought of my sumud as defending my
mother and the mothers of others. I was continually thinking about the martyrs and captives
and the Palestinians-in-sumud. I thought about the martyr Ibrahim El-Ra’ii and constantly
recited songs by the band Sabrin [a Palestinian band that played songs with revolutionary
sentiments]. I was in love with a girl and thought that if I practice sumud I would deserve
her love. For me, to practice sumud meant to exist (cited in Meari 2014, p. 551).
If the flood of the intimate and the social takes over the isolated individual, sumud at once
has a centrifugal quality, as widespread experience of interrogation—since 1967, 800,000
Palestinians in the occupied territories have been detained under military orders—gives families
and comrades embodied knowledge of the individual’s pain, which is hence collectively born
(Addameer 2014). ‘I was feeling the pain of the Palestinians enmeshed with my pain’, reports
Mahmoud: ‘I was not confronting the interrogators alone. I was part of all these people and they
were part of me’ (cited in Meari 2014, p. 574).
Such are the cramped minority conditions of sumud, but what are its specific features and
dynamics as a free indirect mediator? Meari argues convincingly that sumud is not an ideology
or an abstract idea but an emergent, cultivated, ethico-political process developed across
diverse and discontinuous routes and constituencies. Sumud seems to have no origin story
as such; its historicity is more one that pertains to the disruption of colonial historical
continuity, a destruction that leans into the future of struggle, than it is of historical memory.
It is a Palestinian politics, and yet it is derived from a hotchpotch of regional and geopolitical
knowledges, literatures, and histories of anticolonial and communist struggle. Dislodged in this
way from spatio-temporal continuities, without an established archive, sumud indexes neither
an established and coherent Palestinian people, a political organisation, nor particular writers
and practitioners, or it does so only imperfectly. Rather, its associations are as much to the open
series of its practice and elaboration as it develops new manifestations, significations, and
textures of social, intimate, and political life. Like a minor literature with its ‘cellar’ ever
rewritten on the pages of its magazines, Meari describes how the serial elaboration and
extension of sumud takes place in critical examination of its ‘minute detail’, through the
obsessive and meticulous recounting of successful and failed experiences, undertaken in
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conversation and in text. These texts are decidedly fragmentary in quality, smuggled out of
prison via ingested capsules, circulated in books bound in fake covers which, in the case of
Mahmood Fanoon’s The Philosophy of Confrontation, never bear the name of their author, a
sign at once of necessary secrecy and the collective nature of the struggle of which it speaks. It
is readily apparent that in and through these qualities sumud developed the catalytic force of a
mediator—it was its raison d’être, to draw the individual away from confession, to intensify
and extend Palestinian struggles. It is a capacity that also took sumud beyond the confines of
the interrogation, to become a means by which families and comrades projected solidarity back
into the interrogation scene—steadfast in the declared knowledge that there would transpire no
confession—and drew new substance into struggle across everyday life, as popular song,
poetry, the crossing of checkpoints, and techniques of Israeli boycott, all become charged as
practices of sumud in the unfurling of its problem.
Conclusion
Attending, as I have, to one of the most enduring and egregious experiences of oppression in
modern times is not to adopt a politics of the very worst. If the proletariat is an open plane of
cramped minority conditions and mediators, any particular political site must draw in and push
out to other sites and problems in fragmented series—this is the social condition of cramped
space, and its peculiar mode of collectivity. It poses problems. How can relations be drawn
against the crisis of social reproduction under austerity conditions, with its particular deleterious
effects on gender, disability, and racialisation? How can such politics articulate with the passive
slaughter of migrants in the passage across the Mediterranean, the intensification of work and
creeping unemployment, mundane and militarised racism, and neo-imperialist war and
occupation? What mediators will this politics construct? These are open questions for minor
politics, which works over the cramped social conditions of any particularity with the
knowledge that the answers will not be found in projecting the autonomy of a global subject.
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